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THE OFFICERS OF THE FUTURES: THINKING THROUGH 
THE REVOLUTION 
by 
Erik Jansen 1 
Naval Postgraduate School 
It is widely held that a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) confronts the 
Department of Defense and its armed forces as they move through the first part of 
the 21st Century. This RMA is the result of at least four major sea changes (see 
Figure 1 ): first, a revolution in the global strategic context; second, a revolution in 
technology; third, a revolution in organizational forms; and fourth, a socio-cultural 
revolution. In order to successfully respond to and have effects on its complex, 
rapidly changing environment, DoD and its armed forces are critically examining 
themselves. Fundamental questions of strategy and mission, organization and 
technology, people and culture are the subject of dialogues. An especially important 
question within this context concerns what this revolution means for command, 
leadership, and management as the military transitions through and into a newly 
configured 21st century force. 
This paper contributes to this "officer of the future" dialogue. The question is 
complex, which means that insights into solving it require multiple points of view and 
attempts to integrate these points of view. The question also is reflexive: it turns 
back on itself. How it is asked shapes the answer to the question. Thus, the 
approach to asking the question is as important as any proposed insights or answers. 
The "officer of the future" question is here framed in terms of three "fit" 
questions. First, it is a question of person-situation fit: How are people expected to 
behave in their roles of commanders, leaders, and managers in the emerging 21st 
century force? This question in turn presupposes an understanding of future 
leadership roles -- with their attendant responsibilities for tasks of planning, directing, 
organizing, coordinating, controlling, and motivating - in the context of 21st century 
military organizations. This is a question of organization fit: How will leadership roles 
1 The author wishes to thank his colleagues and students at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
especially Carl Jones, Shelley Gallup, Susan Hocevar, Ken Thomas and George Thomas. 
change to fit a new context of technology, human resource systems, culture and 
other structural properties (e.g., decentralization). This in turn presupposes 
understanding strategic fit, which focuses on the appropriateness of various 
organizational configurations (e.g., bureaucracy) given specific environmental factors 
(e.g., complexity, change, and hostility). 
We pursue a systemic-holistic approach and begin with the question of 
strategic fit, examining environmental dimensions and their impact on organizational 
forms and leadership roles. We next turn to organizational fit and focus on human 
resource management and organizational culture. Finally, we end with the question 
of person-situation fit. 
There are, broadly speaking, two necessary and complementary approaches 
to tackling these "fit" questions. The empirical-inductive approach recently has been 
pursued by, among others, Hocevar (2000), Packard (1998), and Hendrix (2001). By 
looking for themes and consensus in the arguments and insights of experts, general 
propositions and conclusions emerge. A complementary, alternative approach is 
taken here. We begin with theory-based, a-priori propositions and deductively derive 
insights and projections about organizational changes and their consequences for 
leadership. 
The theories deployed here are constrained by: (1) a focus on command, 
leadership and management tasks (e.g., directing, coordinating, controlling); (2) a 
view of organizations, groups, and people as human information processing systems; 
(3) an initial focus on strategic fit (i.e., organization-environment fit); (4) a consequent 
focus on issues of decentralization and mutual adjustment, innovation and learning, 
intrinsic task motivation and decision style; and (5) a preference for contingency 
theories that emphasize systematic trade-offs rather than "one best way" solutions. 
In addition, we rely on theories that have developed out of long research traditions 
involving communities of scholars and practitioners. 
THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS 
Figure 1 presents a model of the environmental factors that drive revolutions in 
military affairs and the dimensions or domains within which one observes these 
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revolutionary changes in organizations. Four environmental factors can drive such a 
revolution. These are: 
1. Changes in the geo-political-economic context, which may be called strategy-
driven change; 
2. Changes in technical systems and physical technology, which we call 
technologically driven change; 
3. Changes in socio-cultural factors, including people's norms, values and 
expectations, which is culturally driven change; and 
4. Changes in forms of planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling 
structures and processes, which is to say a change in organizational forms. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
One comment is in order about the fourth factor. Although it has been 
commonplace to think of revolutions as resulting from technological innovations, less 
recognition is accorded to the importance of new modes of organizing in generating a 
revolution.2 The current context within which the RMA is being driven includes 
emerging organizational forms that may or may not be appropriate for DoD's 
missions and organizations. (Indeed leaders may inappropriately imitate new 
organizational forms that have become fashionable even though these are 
inappropriate for their specific context [Mintzberg, 1993].) 
Figure 1 also presents a set of domains for conceptualizing how a revolution in 
military affairs manifests itself within organizations. These domains provide a focus 
for different points of view or frames of reference that highlight different aspects of 
organizations and organizational theory. These are: 
2 Blitzkrieg is a classic example. It was a novel strategy implemented through an organizational 
design that enabled a military strategy. A critical point is that operational innovation does not 
necessarily flow out of technological advances. All armies of the 1940s had access to the 
technological innovations that made Blitzkrieg possible; only the Germans implemented operational 
innovations that enfolded these technical advances into an organizational design. This insight is 
expressed clearly by numerous military writers. Thus Arquilla and Ronfelt (1997) assert that, "The 
information revolution is not solely or mainly about technology; it is an organizational as well as a 
technology revolution" (p. 5). 
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FIGURE 1 
Environmental Drivers and Organizational Domains Composing the 
Revolution in Military Affairs. 
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1. Strategy, which includes the articulation of new visions, strategies, missions, 
and strategic intent. "Strategy focuses on "what needs to be done, and why" 
(Evered, 1983). The why question requires an explication of purpose, of the 
relationship of the organization to its stakeholders, and of adaptation to the 
organization's environment 
2. Platforms. technical systems. and systems development, which focuses on 
the development and deployment of new technical systems, physical 
technologies (including platforms and facilities), and especially the 
development of interconnected "systems of systems" to accomplish the 
requisite tasks. 
3. Structural configurations and properties, which focus on organizational roles 
and role relationships as they relate to accomplishing requisite tasks. These 
tasks include those (1) at the level of operational workflow (e.g., sensor to 
shooter activities); and (2) at the level of planning, directing, organizing, 
coordinating, and controlling operational activities. 
4. Human resource systems, which focus on getting competent, motivated 
people into roles that are appropriately embedded within reward systems that 
align individual goals and organizational goals. 
5. Culture, which is a distributed social cognition that includes shared meanings, 
values, norms, and expectations as these are embodied in ideology, stories, 
customs, and rituals. 
Organizational theory and design address the RMA as a problem of fits and 
misfits. An organization that has proven itself well adapted (i.e., efficient and 
effective) may come into a strategic misfit as a result of changes in its environment. 
Strategic fit requires that the organization's structure of role relationships as these 
relate to tasks and technologies be in alignment with its environment. Chandler's 
(1962) statement that "structure follows strategy" is a principle of strategic fit. 
Thinking through the RMA is problematic partly because it requires solving a complex 
problem of organizational adaptation to a changing environment. The environmental 
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drivers of the RMA in Figure 1 require a reconfiguration of a complex set of 
organizational domains. 
As leadership solves the problem of readaptation to a changing environment, 
they simultaneously must solve the problem of organizational fit. Organizational fit is 
a match among the organizational dimensions on the right side of Figure 1 ; these 
dimensions are themselves instantiated in organizational policies, systems, practices, 
and procedures. The results of misfits among these organizational dimensions are 
lost opportunities and weakened performance (Donaldson, 2000, p. 7). In a military 
context, such misfits translate to impaired unity of effort, efficiency, and effectiveness. 
All of this is to assert a systems perspective on organizations. To be 
competitive, organizations require a sustainable advantage in how they solve the 
adaptive problem of strategic fit with their environment. They must simultaneously 
solve the integrative problem of organizational congruence among the dimensions of 
strategy, technology, organizational structure, human resource management, and 
culture. In the context of a paradigm shift or revolution, potential solutions are 
embedded in transformational processes that require leaders to be change agents. 
With this context in mind, we turn our attention to the officers of the future question. 
THE OFFICERS OF THE FUTURE 
The officer of the future question is complex and can be framed in many ways 
that in turn shape the answers that are offered. DoD and its services are investing 
considerable resources and talent toward understanding each of these problem 
domains. 3 Our version of the question results from beginning with a system wide 
organizational perspective that emphasizes the roles of officers in terms of their 
command and leadership tasks. It is: 
What changes should we anticipate in how officers of the future plan, 
direct, organize, coordinate, control and motivate in the likely situations 
that face them in the 21st century military organizations emerging from 
the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)? 
3 This is not to say that each question has received equal resource allocation, nor that being tasked to 
tackle one problem set versus another is accorded the same degree of prestige. 
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Three points should be made with respect to this question. 
First, the question focuses on the change, transformation and the future. 
There doubtless are attributes of and requirements for future officers that are 
timeless, as a reading of Sun Tzu reveals. Because this paper begins with the 
context of the RMA, it is natural that its primary focus is on what is likely to change 
rather than what is likely to remain relatively constant. 
Second, the question is about officers (in the plural) of the future. Individual 
differences and diversity among officers are undoubtedly required for many reasons, 
including: (a) inter-organizational differences resulting from diverse organizational 
missions, technologies and structures; (b) vertical differentiation resulting from 
different levels in the hierarchy (i.e., rank) and career stages; and (c) horizontal 
differentiation due to specialization. Thus, the role requirements for the officers of the 
future will be diverse4. We can simultaneously argue that the RMA is likely to be a 
"sea change" of such magnitude that it will make systemic demands on the jobs and 
careers that await future officers. To take the most obvious example, new levels or 
types of interpersonal and technical competencies may be necessary as the RMA 
makes network centric operations a reality. Thus, there will be wide variation around 
a shifting average. 
Third, the question implies a third type of fit: person-situation fit. Person-
situation fit is based on the principle that individual performance is a joint product of 
the person and his or her situation. Optimal performance is generated when there is 
a match between characteristics of the person and organizational role and career 
requirements, as well as organizational norms and culture. 
With respect to person-situation fit, we divide individual characteristics into two 
sets. The first set is based on talents. competencies. or abilities; other relevant terms 
are skills, knowledge, abilities, and aptitude. The second set of personal 
characteristics is concerned with choice and direction, preferred behaviors, and 
individual effort and persistence. A summary term for this second set of 
characteristics is motivation; other relevant terms are needs, values, styles, 
4 We also should expect diversity of people who take on these roles, given changes in the diversity 
and demographics of the U.S. labor market. 
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involvement, and commitment. Both talent and motivation are relevant to whether 
individuals will fit within a given job, set of roles, career path, or organizational 
culture. Optimal individual performance is generated by a combination of 
competence and motivation. We briefly turn to the question of multi-level fit before 
examining strategic fit as it relates to the officer of the future question. 
Strategic and Organizational Fit 
Answering the officer of the future question is complex partly because it 
involves integrating three levels of analysis that are involved in the three fitness 
questions. This is illustrated in Figure 2. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
The ecological level of analysis comes into focus when an organization 
engages the question of strategic fit. As Figure 2 shows, the question of strategic fit 
focuses on the relationship between the organization and its environment, which 
includes geopolitics, economics, technology, socio-cultural context, and 
organizational stakeholders. Such strategic problems have a relatively longer time 
frame and require analysis of the organization's internal strengths and weaknesses 
as well as environmental opportunities and threats. The organization's tasks and task 
architecture logically derive from its chosen strategy and the nature of its mission 
requirements. (In an operational and tactical military context, this might generate a 
focus on friends, foes and neutrals in the context of physical geography.) 
The organizational level of analysis comes into play as one focuses on the 
question of organizational fit, which also is illustrated in Figure 2. The question of 
organizational fit centers around the requisite tasks that must be accomplished to 
perform the mission and implement strategic intent. The task architecture comprises 
a value chain of tasks that must be accomplished in order to accomplish the mission. 
The requisite tasks thus emerge from the processes of strategy making, and these 
tasks provide the goals and constraints for the coherent design of organizational 
subsystems. 
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Figure 2 
An Open Systems Organizational Model Framing the Design Questions of Organizational Strategy 
and Organizational Fit. 
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Structural configuration and properties5 includes the organization of roles and 
role relationships that must be designed to plan, direct, coordinate, and control 
requisite task performances. In addition, capable and motivated people must be 
resourced through appropriate human resource policies, practices and procedures to 
perform in these roles and to motivate others to perform in their roles. Thus, the 
organizational fit problem requires jointly solving the technological problem, the 
organizational problem, and the human resources problem. Organizational theory 
(especially socio-technical systems theory) emphasizes that these problems of 
structure, technical systems, and human resources must be solved jointly or 
mismatches and suboptimization of performance will occur. 
Note that culture is largely an emergent phenomenon. How people in social 
networks make sense of their situation, how they orient, observe, think and decide-
which is here labeled as "distributed social interpretation" -- is shaped by the design 
decisions and policies that shape structure, technical systems, and human resource 
systems; these are all in turn shaped by task requirements deriving from the answers 
to the strategic question. Thus, leaders impact on culture is primarily indirect. 
Figure 3 adds the third level of analysis to our set fit problems. The person-
situation fit question focuses our attention on people as they are integrated into the 
context of organizational roles, technologies, and cultures to accomplish tasks. In the 
case of officers, their tasks include not only the workflow tasks that are specific to 
their communities and their organization's core technologies (e.g., the value chain of 
sensor to shooter tasks), but also the command and leadership tasks of planning, 
directing, organizing, coordinating, controlling, and motivating. The arrows from 
"people" in Figure 3 also are meant to illustrate that culture only exists in and is 
5 The questions raised in considering structural properties include but are not limited to the following: 
How tall or flat should the organization be? (Vertical differentiation) 
How wide should spans of control be? (Spans of control) 
How many specialties are needed? How many generalists? (Specialization) 
How big should an organization be allowed to grow? (Size) 
How many standard operating procedures, rules, and procedures should we use to control task 
performance? (Formalization and Rules) 
How should we distribute decision rides throughout the firm? (Centralization and Professionalization) 
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distributed through people, and it is people who enact strategy and are responsible 
for unity of effort, efficiency and effectiveness. 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
Again, the complexity of the officer of the future question partly resides in the 
fact that officers are persons who are elements within organizations, and their 
organizations are elements within their larger environments. Organizational theorists 
have long appreciated that multi-level theory construction is extremely intellectually 
challenging. Thinking through the RMA requires at least some military officers who 
are willing to struggle with the demanding fit questions posed by the relationships 
sketched out in Figure 3. (If the complexity of Figures 2 and 3 seem daunting, the 
fact is that they are none-the-less over-simplifications (as all models are). Each box 
represents a rich and complex frame of reference comprising numerous critical 
constructs and propositions.) 
We next focus on a critical subset of factors that are especially relevant to the 
officer of the future question. We do not focus on the content specifics that make up 
the rich texture required to answer the question of strategic fit. This would take us 
into the domain of the Quadrennial Defense Review. Thus, we simply build on the 
work of others in asserting how environmental dimensions (e.g., rate of change and 
complexity) impacting the design of military organizations can be expected to 
change. We examine these dimensions as they impact human information 
processing. 
STRATEGIC FIT: THE ORGANIZATION IN THE 
ENVIRONMENT 
It is typically asserted that the military faces increasingly uncertain 
environments. However, uncertainty would seem to be a dimension that 
characterizes decision makers rather than environments. It is easy to imagine two 
commanders with different staffs who face identical environments; one commander 
might well experience low uncertainty while the second experiences tremendous 
uncertainty. Experience and education provide officers with the mental structures 
that underlie how much uncertainty they will experience. In facing an enemy, they 
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Figure 3 
An Open Systems Organizational Model Framing the Design Questions of Organizational Strategy, 
Organizational Fit, and Person-Situation Fit. 
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use this knowledge to generate higher levels of "uncertainty" for the enemy. 
Uncertainty then seems to reside in the minds of people as they confront their tasks 
rather than in their environments. 
Task Uncertainty, Environmental Change and Equivocality 
A primary driver of decision maker's uncertainty is the rate of environmental 
change.:. The literature on the RMA appears unanimous in arguing that future 
environments will be characterized by increasing rates of change, largely due to 
revolutions in communications and information technologies. Such change means 
that information from the environment must be updated rapidly; the ideal is to have 
"real time" information that instantaneously streams into decision makers. To the 
degree that there are communications lags that delay information, a gap is created 
between the demand for and supply of information. This in turn creates uncertainty, 
which is defined as a gap between what decisions makers need to know and what 
they do know (Galbraith, 1977; Van Creveld, 1985). This uncertainty relates to the 
tasks that must be performed to accomplish the mission; it can therefore be 
conceptualized as task uncertainty. 
The organization in a stable environment faces few surprises; tomorrow looks 
like yesterday. Reliability, efficiency, and control are dominant design themes. 
Organizational theorists describe organizations in stable environments as 
"bureaucracies"; they are "mechanistic" rather than "organic." Bureaucracies6 
function well in stable environments, as they formalize and standardize tasks, job 
descriptions, career paths, core technologies and technical systems in order to 
control their repetitive, predictable task activities. 
In changing environments, plans, standards, rules, and procedures that were 
effective and efficient in the past become inappropriate given new strategies by 
competitors are new stakeholder (e.g., customers, Congress) expectations. A 
bureaucracy in a changing environment may find that critical stakeholders no longer 
6 In common usage, bureaucracy carries negative connotations of "red tape," inefficiency, lack of 
accountability, etc. The usage here is not pejorative. Bureaucracies have survived because they are 
can be efficient, partly because of their size and the economies of scale that they generate. 
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value its strategy and missions. Support becomes insufficient to provide the 
resources necessary to survive. 
Although organizations generally must strive to be efficient, in changing 
environments, they cannot focus primarily on conserving resources and controlling 
costs. Decision makers must take calculated risks to innovate novel strategies, 
technologies, modes of organizing, and means of distributing information and 
knowledge throughout the organization. Such organizations look more "organic" than 
"mechanistic." 
Some forms of change are more dramatic than others. In some cases the 
problem is one of an increased rate of change, which requires the organization to be 
faster. Speed is a design value generated by increased rates of environmental 
change. In terms of leadership, speed requires that decision cycles (e.g., observe, 
orient, decide, act [OODA] loops} be speeded up to be in tempo with the increased 
rates in the environment. In other cases, the change is not simply an increase in rate 
but a qualitative shift in the pattern of relationships. This type of qualitative shift is 
generally meant by the term revolution? Such change produces equivocality rather 
than uncertainty. 
In the case of the equivocality produced by revolutionary change, it is not clear 
what to do with information even when we have it. We lack the mental structures and 
schemas -the knowledge- to know what to do with the information. In the same 
way that the scientific community may confront anomalous empirical facts that fail to 
fit with their accepted paradigm of understanding, so also may leaders in the strategic 
apex fail to have an appropriate paradigm (e.g., a business model} for understanding 
how to observe, orient and decide what their strategy should be or how to organize to 
accomplish that strategy. The "equivocality" produced by such qualitative changes 
require the organization to focus its attention on adaptation and innovative problem 
solving. Rather than exploiting current competencies, it must experiment and 
exploring alternatives. The organization cannot afford to be bureaucratic or 
7 The term revolution has entered our vocabulary as a result of the title of Copernicus's text that 
described the revolution of the earth around the sun. This change in our mental map of our world-
from an earth-centric to a helio-centric perspective- required a paradigm shift in how we thought of 
the world. 
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mechanistic; it must become organic and flexible. How it does this depends on 
another environmental variable: complexity. 
Environmental Complexity and Information Overload 
The literature is unanimous in asserting that the environments faced by DoD 
and its military organizations are increasing in complexity8. Complexity (or integrative 
complexity) is a function of (1) the number of variables or dimensions in the 
environment and (2) the degree of interdependence that exists among these 
variables or dimensions. As the number of factors increase, complexity increases. 
More importantly, as the interactions among the factors increase, complexity 
increases. Because of this second factor, complexity has the potential for generating 
unpredictability and task uncertainty9. However, one can imagine environments that 
are quite complex, but none-the-less relatively stable. Indeed, many bureaucracies -
exemplified by hospitals, universities, accounting firms, and law firms - are highly 
adapted to these stable, complex environments. Thus, from the perspective of 
organizational theory, the "fact" that an environment is becoming increasingly 
complex does not necessarily mean that it will generate task uncertainty or task 
equivocality. 
Environmental complexity does have the potential to generate information 
overload that degrades the performance of decision makers. Figure 5 illustrates the 
well-established relationship between information processing and information load, 
which applies to individuals, groups and presumably organizations. When low 
amounts of information are presented, low amounts are processed; there is idle 
information processing capacity. As the information load increases, decision makers 
8 To give some of the common examples, increased complexity is revealed by: (1) an increase in the 
number of nation-states and in the richness of the associations and alliances among these nations; (2) 
an increase in groups asserting strong ethnic identifications and making claims within their nations; (3) 
an increase in international organizations, including profit-seeking corporations and not-for-profit non-
governmental organizations; (4) an increase in transnational or global organizations that are not 
constrained by traditional authorities or hierarchies; (5) an increase in international criminal 
organizations; (6) the emergence of international and transnational terrorist networks; (7) a continuing 
and perhaps increasing need to rely on local forces and allies; (8) an increase in interdependence and 
interaction among different services (i.e., jointness); and (9) an increase in interdependence among 
government agencies (e.g., DoD, CIA, State and Justice). 
9 This theme is developed further in Perrow's theory of normal accidents. 
Working draft: ejansen@nps.navy.mil 12 
increase the amount of information processed, but only up to a point. As information 
continues to increase, the information being processed (i.e., capability) does not 
simply reach a plateau; instead, there is degradation in the amount of information 
processed. Critical facts, interpretations and relationships are likely to be missed; 
planning, direction, coordination, and control are likely to degrade or break down. 
Figure 5 illustrates a critical relationship that leads to a critical design principle. 
Centralization to a single decision maker makes sense only to the extent that he or 
she has the requisite capacity and requisite variety of information processing skills to 
match the environment. The same "law of requisite variety" holds for groups. Thus, 
centralization in complex environments typically generates an organizational misfit.10 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
The military has long dealt with environmental and task complexity. (The 
author is aware of no argument that the task complexity envisioned in fighting the 
USSR in Europe was not massively complex. Warfare and peacetime operations 
have long been increasing in complexity.) The DoD solution to the problem of 
complexity in stable environments has been training and professionalization. By 
investing in human resource expertise, professional bureaucracies are able to handle 
complexity in stable environments. Decisions are decentralized to experts and 
professionals at the core of the organization (e.g., physicians in hospitals, pilots in the 
military) rather than being referred up the chain of command. These individuals, who 
understand strategic intent and have internalized professional values, are able to 
make critical judgments and decisions about mission critical tasks. Overall 
organizational information processing capacity is increased as decision-making is 
decentralized. Self-leadership and self-management become substitutes for direct 
supervision .11 
10 In the case of classic machine bureaucracies, most decisions are decentralized to standard 
operating procedures (standardization of processes}. The centralized decision maker is dealing with 
exceptions that don't exceed his or her capacity. 
11 Although we have little to say about it in this paper, we should note, for the sake of completeness, 
that another solution for handling environmental complexity is to differentiate the organization into 
different divisions so that each division can focus on a simpler environmental domain. In effect, the 
organization develops a corporate headquarters that oversees other organic divisions. This strategy 
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Figure 4 
Inverted U Function between Complexity of the Information 
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ENVIRONMENT, CONFIGURATION AND COORDINATION 
Figure 5 summarizes much of our discussion to this point. The horizontal axis 
represents environmental complexity (from simple to complex), and the vertical axis 
represents environmental change (from stable to rapidly changing and from 
unequivocal to equivocal). As Figure 5 shows, four configurations are ideally suited 
to the four quadrants defined by the two environmental dimensions (Mintzberg, 
1993); these four configurations, which are discussed below, are: 
1. Machine bureaucracy, 
2. Professional bureaucracy, 
3. Simple structure, and 
4. Adhocracy. 
Each of the above organizational configurations relies on a dominant 
mechanism for planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling its tasks and thus 
generating unity of effort, efficiency, and effectiveness. These mechanisms, which 
also are mapped onto Figure 5, are: 
1. Standardization of work processes, 
2. Professionalization, 
3. Direct supervision, and 
4. Mutual adjustment. 
These four organizational configurations represent four coherent solutions to 
the problem of organizational fit. 
works to the degree that environmental complexity can be segmented (i.e., the interdependence 
among some component factors or forces is less than with others). The organization essentially 
generates a strategy whereby it becomes multiple organizations operating in fairly independent 
environments (e.g., the regional CINCs). The organization then only needs to coordinate at a limited 
set of points, which are dictated by the interdependent, coordinated and coupled environmental 
elements or forces. Officers in the midline of such organizations are able to develop points of view 
appropriate to their sectors - where they may be at the strategic apex of their own division -- and 
spend relatively little time worrying about inter-divisional coordination. As long as there is stability and 
the environmental segmentation makes sense, then a divisional organizational design makes sense. 
Indeed, it may be possible to segment the environment in such a way that one division becomes an 
organic unit designed to function in a dynamically changing environment while other divisions operate 
in more stable environments. (Some would argue this is the rationale behind the special operations 
command [SOCOM].) This design results in midline managers who are clearly at the strategic apex of 
their organization. Compared to those in the midline of functional organizations, these individuals 
have less specialized, more general skills. The military will continue to have organic commands 
nested within other organic commands. The specifics of how to best do this involve the command 
function of "organizing", which in turn is facilitated by some understanding of organizational theory. 
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Insert Figure 5 about here 
As previously discussed, it would seem that military organizations have long 
been moving toward increased task complexity as a result of increased 
environmental complexity (from left to right in Figure 5). The RMA may be 
accelerating this process. Perhaps more dramatically, the RMA is driving some 
military organizations (especially operational units) into environments that are 
characterized by rapid change (from the bottom to the top in Figure 5). (This does 
not mean that every organizational unit is being driver toward the upper right. It does 
not mean that every organization should proactively attempt to move to the upper 
right. Needlessly leading a bureaucracy into more organic forms is likely to generate 
inefficiencies and introduce misfits that lead to its increased vulnerability.) 
Most organizations are hybrids residing between the pure configurational 
types presented below. All organizations must use some standardization of 
processes and skills, direct supervision and mutual adjustment. What distinguishes 
them is the degree to which they rely on one or two dominant mechanisms. 
Machine Bureaucracies: Coordination through Standardization of Work 
Processes 
Machine bureaucracies are adapted to relatively simple, stable environments. 
Such organizations are typically mature, large, and have a long history, often with 
strong traditions. They have fairly clear boundaries that serve to buffer them from 
their environments. There may be many tasks necessary to implement the mission, 
but they can be segmented and handled relatively independently.12 The technology 
is highly regulated and routinized. 
The dominant means of coordinating and controlling is thus standardization of 
work processes. Most decisions are encoded into an extensive set of rules and 
procedures. The organization has a large proportion of technocrats and experts that 
form a technostructure. They formalize and standardize the workings of the core 
12 More specifically, task interdependence has low reciprocity. It is likely to be characterized by 
pooled or sequential interdependence. (cf. Thompson, 1967) 
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operators. Such standardization suggests a machine metaphor (excellence as a 
"well oiled machine"). 
When an unexpected event does occur - an "exception" - that does not 
conform to the standardized processes, it is referred up the chain of command to a 
level that legitimately and rationally can decide what to do. Direction setting is the 
domain of top management (i.e., the strategic apex). They work to fine tune the plan 
and create contingency plans for the fairly predictable changes in the environment. 
Leadership is top-down through a differentiated mid-line that functions to support 
these directives, coordinate between functions, and resolve conflicts. Thus, the 
image of the machine bureaucracy emphasizes the values of efficiency and reliability 
where missions are clear and slow to change. 
Personnel in machine bureaucracies require little training. Lower level 
personnel are expected to follow orders, not use expertise and judgment. The 
reward system relies primarily on extrinsic motivation, including threats of 
punishment. At their best, machine bureaucracies have been able to establish a 
psychological contract in which their members exchange their loyalty for job security. 
In the case of the military, members also may experience normative-affective 
rewards, which is to say, they can feel proud and "stand tall" because they are doing 
their duty and satisfying deep personal and social values. 
Simple Structures: Coordination through Direct Supervision 
If the environment is dynamically changing and therefore unpredictable, then 
improvisation, opportunism, and rapid decision-making must replace more 
deliberative planning and decision-making. Standard operating procedures and 
plans won't work if the reality they are designed for has changed. If the changing 
environment is simple, then direction and coordination problems can be managed by 
one mind -a boss or commander- who takes decisive, fast action to respond to 
changes. Simple structures are typically young and small13. We are most likely to 
recognize a hybrid version of this form in the military when an unexpected problem 
13 Entrepreneurial or start-up organizations often begin as such simple structures, which then develop 
into other configurations as they grow large or become increasingly complex. 
Working draft: ejansen@nps.navy.mil 16 
arises, and we observe a designated commander who is tasked with developing a 
task force to solve this problem. In such a situation, the early stages of standing up 
the command resemble that of a simple structure, but it is a hybrid form in that it is 
embedded in a much larger, formalized structure.14 
Professional Bureaucracies: Coordination through Standardization of Skills 
As environmental complexity increases, organizations are faced with 
increasing numbers of interdependent tasks. 15 As Figure 4 indicates, it will drive a 
single decision maker into information overload. Such complexity is impossible to 
explicitly delineate and formalize in a set of standard operating procedures. One 
solution to this dilemma is to have standardization of work processes and direct 
supervision take a back seat to the human judgments of people doing the work itself. 
The tasks of the core technology become controlled by lower level "professionals" 
with tacit knowledge who are expected to use their "professional judgment." We see 
this in such professional bureaucracies as hospitals, accounting firms, law firms, and 
universities. 
Highly educated, highly skilled professionals who have gone through extended 
educations and internships coordinate and control the core technology of the 
professional bureaucracy. They are highly indoctrinated and thus capable of making 
value judgments as they face their complex tasks. Planning and direction is 
performed at the top but requires consultation with key professionals who are highly 
regarded by their organizational colleagues. The legitimacy of the midline - and 
often those in the strategic apex - depends on their professional credentials, 
legitimacy and credibility, which includes their ability to persuade their members that 
their vision and strategy makes sense. The strategic apex functions largely in terms 
14 In the early stages of standing up an organization, formalization and standardization are minimal. 
The dominant means of coordinating and controlling is thus direct supervision. There is little need for 
training or indoctrination in the early start up stage, although this develops with growth as the 
organization typically develops into a formalized structure or - if environmental change and complexity 
are high - as it moves toward the configuration of an adhocracy. 
15 The logic for this is related to the "Law of Requisite Variety." As the number of environmental 
variables increase and become interdependent, then, in order for the organization and its leadership to 
capture the resources and requisite information needed to compete, they must be able to match the 
complexity and variety of their environment. The reader also will see that this logic leads to a search 
for "niche strategies." 
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of being a liaison with other organizations and their leaders. Professionals, who 
coordinate largely through self-directed mutual adjustment to accomplish the mission 
of the organization, control the midline. Much, even most, decision-making is bottom-
up. Authority is less visible in this form than in the simple or machine bureaucracy 
configurations. 
Personnel in professional bureaucracies expect equitable extrinsic 
compensation, and professional status is important. But the dominant rewards are 
likely to be intrinsic task rewards: opportunities to work on interesting, meaningful 
projects, to autonomously control how they do the work, to monitor their own 
progress, and to develop their professional talents and skills. 
Professional bureaucracies, like machine bureaucracies, have high horizontal 
specialization, but unlike machine bureaucracies, they have short hierarchies, often 
of only three or four levels. It thus is not surprising to see writers argue that the 
future force will be a flatter organization; organizational theory suggests that a tall 
hierarchy is likely to be a potential misfit for a professionalized, information age 
force. 16 
Adhocracy: Coordination through Mutual Adjustment 
Adhocracies are adapted to complex, changing environments. They are too 
inefficient to survive in simple, stable environments. The organization often has a 
permeable boundary that results in a high proportion of its members being actively 
engaged in transactions (and problem solving) with the external environment. The 
organization's tasks have many components that interact and dynamically change; 
there is often conflict among stakeholders on appropriate courses of action and 
action strategies. Adhocracies thus must deal with uncertainty, potential overload, 
and equivocality. They must thus know how to manage their stress and have high 
tolerances for ambiguity. 
16 The problem of vertical differentiation is complex. The environmental variable of hostility - a threat 
to the resource based of the organization - may justify a somewhat higher level of vertical 
differentiation than we would find in most commercial or government organizations. In addition, we 
should recognize that promotions may be related to rewards rather than to real changes in level of 
responsibility or authority. The issue of the appropriate number of steps in the military's hierarchy in 
an important strategic human resource issue that merits a continuing dialogue this author has not yet 
seen. 
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A team of decision makers is generally required to plan, direct, organize, 
coordinate, and control such organizations. However, in the event of crises, this 
team may turn to one of their more charismatic members if the individual can present 
a credible and persuasive vision. 
Adhocracies do not focus on efficiency; some loss of efficiency is required to 
do meaningful experiments and to take the risks necessary for readapting in a 
dynamic environment. There are thus opportunities for individuals to improvise, and 
jobs morph as individuals see opportunities and initiate actions to advance their 
organization's mission. Indeed, the idea of "jobs" becomes seemingly irrelevant and 
is replaced by the idea of "work", which is enacted in the context of a dynamically 
changing environment. Individuals are expected to be self-directive, teams self-
organize, and coordination is by mutual adjustment; control is largely through self-
monitoring and lateral communications. 
Direction is sometimes top-down, sometime bottom-up, sometimes side to 
side, and often claimed by different actors who tell variants of a story that make each 
teller sound more central to the decision making process. The strategic apex 
functions as an external liaison, balances work in light of external demands, and 
generally tracks projects and programs are they evolve. Leadership continually 
participates in shaping the organization's processes. Authority is less visible in this 
organization than in others. Legitimacy depends more on expertise and results than 
formal status and rank. 
Personnel in adhocracies typically require extensive education and training. 
However, too much indoctrination and socialization can be dysfunctional as it is likely 
to be based on outdated concepts and models. Indeed, part of the function of the 
adhocracy may be to come up with future concepts, which means challenging current 
modes of thinking. 
A Note on "Professionals". Mutual Adjustment. Direct Supervision. and 
Standardization of Processes 
The term "professionals" typically refers to individuals; "professionalization" 
refers to the standardization of skills that allows for the decentralization of planning, 
directing, coordinating and controlling processes; "professional bureaucracy" refers to 
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an organizational configuration. In addition, many occupational groups aspire to the 
label "professional." Therefore, confusion is nearly inevitable in common usage. 
As indicated above, the professional bureaucracy operates by establishing a 
professional core at the bottom-most level of the organization. The professionals 
may have support personnel they "supervise", but they have few if any direct reports. 
(Consider law firms, accounting firms, hospitals, and universities.) In professional 
bureaucracies, the professionals are not isolated to the midline or strategic apex. 
They typically have many years of education, not simply to develop technical skills, 
but to make value-laden judgments related to the complex tradeoffs involved in 
accomplishing the core workflow tasks. (They are highly educated, not just highly 
trained.) 
The simple structure dominated by a single boss may have a boss who is a 
professional; machine bureaucracies typically have technocrats and support 
personnel -- and may have midline and strategic personnel -- who are professionals. 
Adhocracies may have professionals distributed throughout the organization. In 
short, professionals exist outside of professional bureaucracies. To the degree an 
organization professionalizes, its lower level personnel require long periods of 
education for judgment. 
Mutual adjustment exists in all organizations. Machine bureaucracies require 
that individuals make mutual adjustments to coordinate their actions; however, such 
adjustments do not occupy much time or talent compared to more organic 
configurations. In Adhocracies, mutual adjustments are likely to include liaison roles, 
permanent coordinating roles, matrix structures, temporary task forces and 
continuing, emerging meetings. That is, the number (and expense) of lateral 
processes increases dramatically. 
Similarly, direct supervision exists in all complex, formal organizations. 
Control can occur outside a "governance structure", as in a market or a culture, but 
organizational coordination necessarily involves hierarchy and some level of direct 
supervision. Thus, "network centric organizations" or "adhocracies" may imply a 
flatter, more distributed organizational form; it does not imply the absence of a 
hierarchy and direct supervision. 
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Finally, all organizations standardize processes wherever possible to gain 
efficiencies. Even if network centric organizations become the norm for MOOTW and 
warfare, the bureaucratic model may be more appropriate for peacetime services 
tasked with providing the resources to warfighting commanders. This produces an 
image of ever more efficient hybrids of professional-machine bureaucracies and 
professional-adhocracy hybrid network centric organizations in the 21st century force. 
DoD comprises many large, complex organizations in its many divisional 
structures; diverse configurations operate simultaneously. Furthermore, even an 
organizational unit that is primarily a machine bureaucracy may rely on teams and 
mutual adjustment in some subunits (e.g., the R&D function). An adhocracy may 
standardize or centralize certain financial decisions (e.g., currency exchange) or a 
"final launch" decision. In order to avoid management fads and fashions that fail 
because their useful insights are not appropriately applied, we should be suspicious 
of prescriptions that suggest that one organizational configuration will be the solution 
to the RMA. 
Environmental Hostility 
Before leaving the topic of organizational environments, we consider one last 
dimension relevant to strategic fit and organizational design: hostility. Environments 
can range from resource rich and supportive to resource poor and threatening. The 
dimension of hostility thus refers to how benign or malevolent an environment is to an 
organization's strategy, missions and tasks. Hostility can thus include enemies using 
violence or natural disasters. 
Hostility and crisis generate change and thus move an organization toward the 
upper quadrants of Figure 5. But hostility does more than this. It creates a 
competitive, win-lose conflict that requires information and decision-making 
superiority. Actors naturally turn toward a center with whom they can communicate 
and from whom they can receive direction. Environmental hostility thus generates 
pressures for centralized decision-making and control. A trusted staff and network of 
trusted experts or colleagues may back a centralized commander, but there has 
historically been one clear locus of final decision-making authority. Once a crisis has 
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passed, an organization may move back toward other modes of direction and 
coordination (e.g., mutual adjustment or professionalization).17 
Pushing an organization into the upper right quadrant of extreme complexity 
and change through hostile actions has traditionally created a terrible misfit. The 
organization is likely to temporarily centralize decision making in order to respond to 
the crisis. The organization thus takes decisive action rather than taking the time 
necessary to respond fully to the complexity of information being presented under the 
proposition that "the best cannot be allowed to be the enemy of the good." However, 
the decision maker(s) faced by high complexity and will miss critical inputs, points of 
view, relationships and interactions. A decision may be "lucky," and the organization 
may succeed in the short run. However, if the organization is held in this extreme 
domain of crisis, change, and complexity, luck will run out as the command is 
overloaded. In such cases, the organization, suffering overload and stress, can be 
expected to disintegrate. The upper right of Figure 5 thus may be considered the 
domain of chaos. A goal of network centric warfare is to develop an organization that 
can generate and function at levels of chaos- high complexity, change, and hostility 
--that will overload and disintegrate the command and organization of its opponents. 
The emphasis to this point has been on strategic fit: the fit of the organization 
with its environment. We have not discussed the content of strategy or the richness 
of strategic thinking. Instead we have focused on environmental dimensions as they 
create a context for structural configuration and properties (Figure 5). Underlying the 
discussion above is the assumption that organizational planning, direction, 
organizing, coordination and control largely take place through a set of command or 
leadership processes that include not only direct supervision through the chain of 
command, but also standardization of work processes, professionalization and 
training, and mutual adjustment. These last three processes can serve as 
"substitutes for leadership" (Kerr, 1975) that increase the total information processing 
capacity of the organization and reduce the information load on the strategic apex. 
17 It also seems to be the case that charismatic leadership is most sought after and most successful 
under hostile conditions of crisis (cf. Bradley, 1987). Indeed, military rank and status, as supported by 
formal policies and organizational culture, may be viewed as a set of formal mechanisms for creating a 
charismatic center when such critical control through direct supervision is required. 
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The Trajectory of Strategic and Organizational Fit 
Figure 6 presents an estimate of the vector that characterizes the direction 
toward which DoD's modal military units- and therefore DoD -- are moving as the 
RMA emerges.18 There obviously is great variability around this vector, with some 
organizational units moving in opposite directions and some - especially those 
closest to the "core" tasks most impacted by network centric technology -- moving 
more dramatically toward the upper right quadrant. Figure 6 indicates that modern 
military effectiveness in the 21st century will move military organizations toward 
increased professionalization and mutual adjustment. Thus, information operations, 
knowledge management, and learning are becoming critical design values for the 
21st century force 
Insert Figure 6 about here 
Figure 7 indicates that wartime operations against formidable opponents or 
military operations other than war in crisis conditions move organizations toward the 
edge of chaos: high change and uncertainty, high equivocality, potentially high 
complexity, and extreme hostility. One vision of the 21st century operational force 
(doing warfighting or MOOTW) would be of a technically enabled network of 
experienced commanders with reachback to expert advisers operating with mutual 
understanding, trust, and real-time information inputs. The organizational 
configuration would be a hybrid professional bureaucracy-adhocracy that moves 
toward more mutual adjustment, as operations require. Decision rights (or authority) 
18 One can make a historical argument for this vector; only a rough and oversimplified sketch is given 
here. The European Armies locked into World War I would appear to represent an extreme in 
industrial age, mechanistic warfare. The opposing forces were trapped in an equilibrium in which each 
side operated in a stable, simple environment. The requisite tasks of the organization could be 
simplified, differentiated, and assigned to individuals with relatively short training requirements. 
Control was through standardization of processes with centralized command of machine 
bureaucracies. 
World War II and the Cold War required confronting ever more complex environments. The rise of 
communication technologies (e.g., Blitzkrieg) resulted in increased interdependence and complexity 
and increasing speed of operations. In the cold war context of deterrence, peacetime armies 
functioned in more complex, but none-the-less stable environments. Although more tasks required 
implicit, professionalized warriors, standardization, formalization and bureaucracy characterized the 
force. In the insurgent warfare of Vietnam, increased direct supervision, decentralization, and mutual 
adjustment through the midline were required to deal with the hostility, change, and complexity of the 
war. The degree to which the bureaucracy adapted remains in debate. 
Working draft: ejansen@nps.navy.mil 23 

Figure 6 
Shift in Organizational Configuration for Modal DoD Organizations as 








t5 2st Century 
:::J 
c: ~ JFo= -~ C/) 





m ;: ·c: 








Task Comglexitv Complex 
would be distributed and decentralized in a flattened hierarchy. This network would 
not negate the authority and accountability of the chain of command, which would 
function to shape the network as it simultaneously shapes itself (i.e., self-organizes) 
to accomplish the mission in accordance with strategic intent. In the absence of 
crisis and hostility, the organization might well revert to a professional bureaucracy 
that practices or readies itself to function as an adhocracy. 
Insert Figure 7 about here 
ORGANIZATIONAL FIT: THE LEADER AND THE MILITARY 
ORGANIZATION OF THE 21 8T CENTURY 
Figures 2 and 3 show that organizational fit comprises fit among structural 
configuration and properties, technology and technical systems, human resources 
policies, practices, and procedures, organizational culture and - most critically - the 
requisite tasks required to accomplish the mission. The devil of organizational fit and 
design is in the details. Organizational design requires a deep understanding of core 
military processes. This requires understanding how platforms, technology and 
technical systems, including computers and communications systems, enable tasks, 
as well as the strengths and limitations of such systems. 
DoD invests heavily in providing its military officers with continuing 
professional education and vesting command in those with years of accumulated 
experience. Such processes of professionalization have increased as environments 
and tasks have become increasingly complex. Officers will continue to require deep 
knowledge of the arts and science of strategic, operational, and tactical command. 
To the degree that self-organization becomes a reality, officers will have to develop 
new mental models and doctrine with respect to networked processes of command 
and coordination. 
No paper can address all of the organizational design factors in Figures 2 and 
3. We provide a broad-brush perspective of the some of the organizational logic 
needed to achieve organizational fit for 21st century military organizations with special 
emphasis on human resource and people issues. 
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Figures 2 & 3 indicate that fitness is judged with respect to particular criteria 
and how the organization performs. Organizational performance is enfolded in a 
context of culture and "distributed social cognition." Culture - like leadership --
serves to direct, coordinate, and control. Before turning to other organizational design 
factors as they relate to leadership, we briefly turn our attention to culture. 
Culture, Distributed Social Cognition, and Doctrine 
Culture comprises a powerful set of forces for direction, coordination and 
control. It distributed in shared schemas 19, templates, or mental maps that 
individuals have for orienting, observing, reflecting and deciding. Such schemas are 
learned and internalized as a result of membership within groups, organizations, and 
societies. leaders shape these mental maps through their communications, 
behaviors as role models, and control over rewards and punishments. However, they 
cannot directly reach into the minds of individuals nor micro-manage group 
interactions that generate these shared schemas. Figure 2 thus indicates that culture 
is an "emergent phenomena" that is generated as a consequence of organizational 
context. 
Culture is included in the "organization fit" question, but culture is not an 
organizational design factor that leaders can directly leverage. leaders typically 
"manage" culture indirectly through their manipulation of the organizational design 
factors indicated in Figure 2.20 These organizational design factors include the 
redesign of technology, organizational restructuring, and- especially- how to select, 
retain, promote and reward people. In addition to indirectly "managing" culture, 
19 Schemas or schemata are mental structures that codify experience and include a particular, 
organized way of perceiving cognitively and responding to a complex situation or set of stimuli. 
(Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2001.) 
20 In large, complex organizations, charismatic leadership can certainly energize and direct followers 
to change their behavior. This is facilitated by crisis or a motivating threat. Such change may not 
persist when a charismatic leader (or the threat) disappears unless there also have been changes in 
requisite tasks, technology, social roles, or human resource policies. 
Charismatic leaders are more likely to have an enduring impact in smaller organizations and if their 
leadership role is that of the founder, in which case their legacy may be quite enduring. However, it is 
also in these cases that it is easiest to impact - especially as a founder - the organizational design 
factors (cf. Bradley, 1987; Burton & Obel, 1995). 
Working draft: ejansen@nps.navy.mil 25 
leaders are embedded in culture. Their legitimacy, credibility, and communications 
are necessarily interpreted in terms of culture. 
Culture cannot be related to a single configuration, to particular dimensions of 
tasks, or to limited environmental domains; it thus cannot be placed in a single 
quadrant of Figure 5. However, some organizations do indeed seem to rely on 
culture more than others. In the military context, as with the church, doctrine 
traditionally has been developed to guide leaders whose geographic removal from 
corporate authority requires them to internalize the beliefs, values, and norms of a 
distant leadership. In this case, where other modes of control (direct supervision, 
mutual adjustment, standardization, continuing interaction with colleagues and 
professionals) are absent or weak, culture fills the gap.21 The military thus 
emphasizes the importance of distributed social cognition and culture as formalized 
in doctrine. 
Commercial firms sometimes describe culture as, "how we do business here". 
Thus, it is not surprising to see military doctrine described as the "collective 
understanding of how [we] ... will fight and conduct other operations" (Sullivan & 
Harper, 1996, p. 1 0). Culture and doctrine's relationship to information, knowledge 
and understanding is critical, as is revealed by the following quote: "For the military 
professional, doctrine is not what to think but how to think. (p. 10). Doctrine, to be 
functional for planning, direction, organization, coordination and control, must be 
embedded in culture. It must be internalized into the "normative order" of its 
members. Doctrine, as internalized schemas, provides a context within which military 
personnel understand commander's intent. 
A Culture for 21st Century Military Forces 
Relatively recent research (Quinn and Rohrbugh; 1983; Zammuto & 
Krackover, 1991; Burton & Obel, 1995) suggests some observations about the 
requisite attributes of culture for the 21st century military forces (i.e., network centric 
21 Consider indoctrination and doctrine in the church's "control" of missionaries. To take an extreme 
military example, isolated prisoners of war depend on acculturation and indoctrination to maintain their 
integrity as organizational members of the armed forces because of the power of and memory of 
culture. 
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organizations and professional bureaucracies and their hybrids). The emphasis 
should shift toward norms of flexibility and adaptability with counter-norms of control 
(cf. Merton, 1967). There will be an emphasis by lower level organizational members 
- especially with movement toward change and hostility -- to orient more toward the 
environment rather than to the internal bureaucracy. 
More specifically, the attributes of a network centric culture would seem to 
require: high levels of trust and cohesiveness based on expertise, experience and 
reputation; an emphasis on surfacing assumptions rather than smoothing conflict; 
autonomy and choice with respect to procedures, goals and priorities; a results 
oriented rather than a process control mindset; and recognition of individual and 
group contributions. This culture is congruent with warfighting and operations other 
than war. (It is debatable as to how much such activities would be rewarded in the 
relatively stable peacetime context of day-to-day military operations, given the size, 
formality, standardization, and status consciousness of typical bureaucracies.) 
An especially critical dimension for coping with change is a culture of 
innovation, which includes being encouraged to take calculated risks with the 
assurance that a bad result will not be a career-ending move. Trust is an extremely 
critical dimension that must pervade both the interpersonal and technical domains. 
Trust can be thought of as the potential energy that pervades the social network, 
which hierarchical relationships release and direct (Bradley, 1987). (The "zero-
defects" mindsets of bureaucratic downsizing and efficiency have generated a culture 
of cautiousness and mistrust for some; it appears, although data is scarce, that this 
now beginning to be turn around.) On its most adaptive edges, the new force's 
culture should reward intelligent, calculated risk taking if innovation and 
experimentation are to thrive. Careerism and putting the self ahead of the team are 
behaviors that are selected against (i.e., punished). What this means in the context 
of specific behaviors, career stages, and situations needs to be worked out in order 
to appropriately design reward systems that are a critical mechanism for leveraging 
culture. 
The military's leadership recognizes the importance of developing learning 
organizations, and this is indeed congruent with the environmental and task domain 
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toward which the forces are moving. One might argue that organizational learning 
has long been essential to military thinking and operations. However, much of this 
learning is has been "single loop learning" that adapts to and maintains the status 
quo. (The image of a "single loop" refers to a simple cybernetic system [e.g., a 
thermostat] that uses feedback to maintain a steady state [e.g., an invariant ambient 
temperature].) Such "single-loop" learning focuses on decision making and problem 
solving within an established frame of reference. Learning thus tends to be 
incremental; assumptions remain unquestioned and hidden. To pursue the current, 
overworked metaphor, officers in a "single-loop" context operate carefully within the 
box. When told to think "out of the box", the unspoken and more powerful message -
given a low trust, low innovation culture - is, "but don't forget the box!" 
By contrast, "generational" or "double-loop learning" focuses on developing 
talents and values for adaptability in dynamic, highly competitive (including hostile) 
environments (cf. Roberts, 2000). Double-loop learning is especially necessary if 
organizations are to be "self-designing." (The double-loop refers to a secondary 
feedback loop that is capable of readjusting the values of the original single loop, 
thus generating a new equilibrium around a new value set.) With generational, 
double-loop learning, re-organization may occur improvisationally (e.g. in the midst of 
military operations). An example of more deliberative self-design is experimentation 
in which the organization alters structures, processes and goals even in the face of 
an apparently optimal adaptation (i.e., it experiments with local misfits; cf. Nystrom et 
al. 1976; Hedberg et al. 1976; Starbuck 1983). A Captain working at the Naval 
Warfare Development Center emphasized the importance of learning to take risks 
that cost resources in order to experiment and Jearn; he said most 06s would be 
likely misfits in his position because their careers had rewarded them for being "good 
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husbanders of resources." Generational learning requires a balance of husbanding 
resources and knowing when to risk resources to generate critical insights.22 
Senge ( 1990} argues that the leader's role in the learning organization is that 
of a designer, teacher, and steward. Working as a synthesizer among associates-
rather than subordinates - leaders challenge prevailing mental models and develop -
with associates- innovations in structure, processes, and culture (i.e., shared mental 
maps}. This may be too extreme an image to permeate the entire military, but it may 
none-the-less be relevant to the officers of the future. It also suggests that officers 
move beyond being learners and assume the more active and intellectually 
demanding responsibility of being teachers (Tichy, 1997} within the chain of 
command. 
Figures 1 and 2 indicate the importance of strategy-driven change and 
organizational strategy to organizational readaptation. Strategy occurs within a 
cultural context and it serves change management. Indeed, as Figure 8 shows, 
strategic management can be viewed as encompassing virtually everything that is 
described in Figures 2 and 3. In this next section, we examine some of the essential 
skill requirements raised by considering strategic leadership and management. 
Strategic Leadership and Management 
Figure 8 presents a model of the knowledge, skills, and abilities associated 
with strategic management and leadership, which Mason, Mitroff and Dickel (1985} 
say, "reflects the organization's strategic capability to balance the demands imposed 
by external and internal forces, and to integrate the overall functioning of the 
organization in order to allocate resources in a manner best designed to meet goals 
and objectives." (p. 13}. Figure 8 indicates that this involves a wide range of skills. It 
is not surprising that strategic responsibility ultimately is reserved for those who have 
had a history of education and experience sufficient to give them the expertise to 
22 Experimentation in the services is primarily single-loop learning when it is designed to exploit 
current technologies, to obtain answers to generate short-term improvements, and thus evaluates 
existing technologies in terms of clearly defined quantitative MOEs. Experimentation is generational 
when it is designed to explore possibilities and generate design insights, thus taking calculated risks to 
leap-frog the competition and reframe current MOEs. A pressure on short-term performance and a 
zero-defects mentality tied to career rewards will undermine learning in general, but especially 
generational learning. 
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have effective templates for processing complex information without being 
overwhelmed. (The complexity is especially great in the case of military 
professionals who face demands to master service and joint perspectives on military 
strategy and the operational arts.) Professionalization processes result in more of 
these skills being required at lower levels in the organization. Adhocracies relying on 
mutual adjustment require even higher degrees of distribution of these skills to 
midline and support levels. 
Insert Figure 8 about here 
To the degree managers at all levels are required to be strategic, this 
demands them to: 
• observe and orient with respect to the environment; 
• generate strategic plans and intentions that form the context within which 
missions and goals are defined; and 
• translate those plans into actions through the strategic control of 
performance. 
Some would argue that the traditional military leadership framework has 
emphasized the bottom-most, "strategic control" components of the model in Figure 
8. As we will see in a future section, such strategic control in the 21st century force is 
more likely to be a result of coaching and coordinating rather than behavioral 
monitoring. The following control activities will remain important: 
• Intimately understand the strengths and weaknesses of their units in order 
to best accomplish their mission; 
• Constantly monitor and evaluate performance; and 
• Vigorously address performance shortfalls. 
Such skills become critical in a hostile environment. In addition and more 
critical for readiness issues, the leader of 21st century force will have to dedicate 
more resources and talent to: 
• envisioning the organization's future and 
• inspiring, coaching, and mentoring individuals and teams to accomplish 
their mission and reach the highest standards of excellence. 
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Figure 8 
Strategic Management and Policy Formulation (Mason, Mitroff & Dickel, 1985) 
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Strategic management emphasizes that managers must be able to mange the 
resource acquisition and allocation process in order to implement strategy. Efficiency 
and accountability concerns will require that the officers of the future 
• possess the economic and financial skills to analyze and understand their 
funding sources and how to deploy them. 
Strategies and missions will fail in the absence of effective planning, 
budgeting, organizing, and controlling. Indeed, it can be argued that the U.S. has 
won its wars as much by effective management as by effective leadership. 
Numerous scholars are concerned that there is a genuine danger in romanticizing 
leadership. By idealizing a select few as leaders and the idea of leadership, 
organizations and individuals risk failure at nurturing and developing leadership 
throughout the organization.23 
Strategic implementation will require officers who are able to lead with respect 
to change efforts. Leading change involves creating internal shocks that create 
generate short-term misfits in order to move toward a more favorable long-term fit. 
Leading Change 
Table 1 presents some well-established skills that are essential for change 
management and shaping the organizational context within which people operate. 
Kotter indicates that change involves developing the agenda for change, which 
people can only interpret according to their existing mental maps and existing 
organizational (and national) culture. This is the cognitively demanding task of 
creating a vision. In addition, change involves understanding the critical stakeholders 
of the status quo and of the change effort. Knowing how to do a strategic 
stakeholder analysis, to surface areas where further "intelligence" needs to be 
collected, and to generate the requisite support while minimizing opposition are skills 
that will serve leaders who must contend with equivocality, complexity, and change. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
23 Failing to develop leadership at all levels of the organization or at the lowest ranks is, of course, is 
less of a problem if the organization is a machine bureaucracy. Individuals in such organizations are 
not expected to think about problems of effectiveness, but to simply follow standard operating 
procedures. 
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Table 1 
Effective Change Leadership in Complex Organizations (Kotter, 1988) 
I. Creating an Agenda for Change 
a. Which includes a vision of what can and should be 
b. A vision that takes into account the legitimate long-term interests of the parties 
involved 
c. Which includes a strategy for achieving that vision 
d. A strategy that takes into account the relevant organizational and environmental 
forces 
II. Building a Strong Implementation Network 
a. Which includes supportive relationships with the key sources of power needed to 
implement the strategy 
b. Relationships strong enough to elicit cooperation, compliance, and (where 
necessary) teamwork 
c. Which includes a highly motivated core group of people. 
Leadership and Management as Strategically Shaping the Organization 
Figure 8 is an excellent vision for professional bureaucracies, but what 
different in the complex adaptive organizations described as adhocracies? At its 
extreme, which may only be relevant for a subset of military environments, 
organizations that function on the edge of chaos (in permanent whitewater, as one 
metaphor has it} require a leader who: 
• has an appreciation for the holistic nature of a system and the emergence 
of system level properties. 
• A nondirective style of leadership. 
• Creating clear fitness criteria for the organization (goals} 
• Having just enough rules to limit randomness in the organization to where it 
is fruitful, but not so many as to put the organization into a state of 
equilibrium. The organization will function at its best when poised at the 
edge of disorder. Designing the rules to achieve this balance is probably 
the most important and challenging tasks of the leader. (Kupers & Roland, 
2000}. 
This may be too extreme to describe the modal military organization of the 
foreseeable future, but it is relevant to those networked organizations that operate 
routinely in domains of extreme change and complexity. It is relevant to the extent 
that officers in the context of network centric operations on the edge of chaos reject 
direct supervision of a single commander as the ultimate integrating coordination 
mechanism.24 In this model, no single agent is "in control." Rather evolution of the 
combat force in the ecology is controlled by the pattern of connections and the 
decision rules of all the agents in the combat force. This is self-organization and self-
synchronization. The leadership emerges in the context of local contingencies. 
24 The assumption underlying these propositions comes from research into chaos and 
complexity in the context of organizational theory (cf. Eisenhardt & Brown, 1998); it is that creativity 
and adaptability is hindered by standardization of mindsets and higher level command processes and 
maximized by deliberately moving toward the edge of chaos. It is an assumption that would seem 
limited to the domain of "knowledge workers" and knowledge leaders. 
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Leaders "shape" the network of relationships through limited, strategic guidance, 
often in the form of coaching, and rules do not accumulate into a bureaucratic 
structure. 
This organizational logic is apparent in the "competence based developmental 
approach" Monsanto has for leading its knowledge workers, who are its most critical 
source of sustainable competitive advantage. Monsanto's core assumptions are: 
• Employee performance cannot be managed. 
• Knowledge workers are the source of competitive advantage. 
• Manage the context of performance rather than performance. (Jones, 
1995) 
This perspective on leading knowledge workers in the context of dynamic 
change may be appropriate for a particular context and a network centric technology, 
but it also demands a workforce that the military commander(s) can trust. It also 
demands a human resource management system that can provide talented, self-
managing professionals and teams. 
Human Resource Management 
Organizational fit requires congruent human resource management policies, 
practice and procedures. Organizational theorists have identified culture and 
competencies - both of which are internalized in people - as relatively inimitable and 
therefore the most sustainable source of long-term competitive advantage.25 The 
human resource (HR) system that attracts, assigns, motivates and retains people into 
the roles- including command and leadership roles-- required for the 21st century 
force is thus critical. The HR system's policies, practices and procedures 
operationalize the solution to the person-situation fit while being a critical component 
in organizational fit problem (see Figure 3). 
25 The logic is easy to follow. Imitable structures, processes and resources provide only very short-
term competitive advantages. By definition, they can be imitated. At the extreme, if a competitor can 
buy talent or technology on the open market, then it is easy copied. At the other extreme, the 
internalized ideologies, beliefs, values, norms and hard-earned competencies acquired through 
continuing training are difficult to impossible to copy. 
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A Developmental. Competency Based Human Resource Model 
Figure 9 presents the components of a developmental, competency-based 
perspective HR system. The component subsystems serve to define, generate, 
reinforce, and sustain the competencies or talent of the force. The competencies that 
are necessary for a network centric force (i.e., a hybrid adhocracy-professional 
force), how they are generated and reinforced, and how they are sustained, may be 
quite different than for a traditional military force. Many would argue that - even as 
the military has been professionalizing over the past decades - the HRM system has 
not kept pace and resembles an industrial age machine model. (This argument 
seems especially prevalent with respect to the detailing system.) 
Insert Figure 9 about here 
Managing Human Resource Tasks 
In essence Figure 9 presents a number of tasks that are required to generate 
the human commitment, motivation and talent for the force. These processes can be 
handled according to the modes of coordination we already have identified. 
Direct supervision. In dynamically changing, relatively simple situations, a 
single boss or commander may well be in the best position to decide issues of 
assignment, promotion, and leadership development. (Field promotions would be a 
case in point.) The immediate supervisor is likely to have critical, local information on 
performance. Even in more stable environments, organizational design empowers 
supervisors with control over rewards and punishments, thus reinforcing the chain of 
command. This typically is done through performance assessment (e.g., fitness 
reports). 
Standardization of processes. To the degree that human resources are in 
ready supply (e.g., in an era of conscription) and the its organizational context simple 
and stable, standardized processes can be efficient in handling HR tasks. In this 
industrial age model, HR decisions are centralized and managed according to 
standardized operating procedures and rules. Personnel or labor relations 
departments tend to have relatively lower status than functions of finance and 
operations. Personnel are likely to feel like cogs in a machine. Extrinsic rewards 
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Figure 9 






(e.g., incentive pay) that can be formalized become a focus of leadership in 
recruitment and retention. HR analysts may deploy sophisticated analytical tools for 
determining how to best control selection, placement, training, and the other 
functions, primarily in terms of logics of efficiency. Career planning is minimum and 
focused primarily on the line organization and the technostructure. Lower level 
personnel tend to be viewed as human expenses rather than human resources who 
merit investment. (This does not rule out talk about the importance of our "people.") 
Standardization of skills. As human resources become more highly valued 
due to requirements for tacit and explicit knowledge, the organization begins to 
depend on a core of HR professionals (generalists and specialists) to better consider 
the values, needs, motives, and talents of human resources, especially knowledge 
workers. There is greater appreciation of the importance of aligning HR policies, 
practices and procedures with organizational strategy. Career planning and 
succession planning are formulated in concert with organizational structure and work 
design. A distinction is likely to emerge between developmental processes (e.g., 
mentoring programs) and evaluation processes (e.g., fitness reports). HR executives 
report directly to the highest officers and are included in strategic planning. Peer 
appraisal and collegial judgments are incorporated into performance evaluation. 
Mutual Adjustment. In an adhocracy, human resource decisions are enfolded 
into other organizational processes. In the context of work, individuals autonomously 
seek problems to solve, programs to contribute to, and partners with whom they can 
develop new projects and skills. Individual skills in problem solving, decision-making, 
listening, agenda setting, negotiation, assumption surfacing and conflict management 
are more actively valued than certifications and degrees (although degrees and 
certificates may provide entry credentials and evidence skills.) Formalization and 
structure are minimal as individuals advance upward and toward preferred projects 
according to credibility and reputation within teams and networks. Decision-making 
and problem solving teams and communities emerge and disappear as local 
conditions, resources and projects dictate. Three hundred and sixty degree 
appraisals are used, often including individuals who are external to the organization. 
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In some ways, the organization looks like a self-organizing labor market, but there is 
clearly a hierarchy of reputation, trust and authority creating hierarchical dynamics. 
In general, DoD and its services are transitioning to a more professional 
approach to HR management that characterizes increased the professionalization of 
its overall force. Although DoD does state-of-the-art Manpower Analysis, it has been 
criticized for lagging behind in its HR management structures and processes (e.g., 
Report of the 8th Quadrennial Review of Militarv Compensation). In the future, the 
services are likely to require line officers who are also familiar with the core 
processes of their organization (e.g., "warfighters") and educated as professional HR 
generalists. In addition, the services will require officers who are Manpower and HR 
specialists in particular task domains (e.g., recruiting; career planning; job and work 
design). 
The HR system ultimately serves to integrate people into the organization's 
roles: to attract, motivate, and retain personnel. The functions associated with 
"reinforcing competencies" and motivation cannot ultimately be delegated to an HR 
function. They ultimately are line responsibilities. A critical aspect of state-of-the-art 
HR systems is a focus on career planning and leadership development, often 
leveraging corporate colleges and lifetime learning into their people's schedules (cf. 
Tichy, 1997). Another critical success factor seems to be continuing leadership 
support and involvement by the highest levels of leadership. These tasks and roles 
will require people who have a more complex and sophisticated appreciation of the 
person-situation fit problem. Finally, the reward system- how goals are defined, how 
performance is measured, how feedback is given, and what rewards are available 
and how they are given - may be leadership's most important design mechanism for 
impacting culture. If rewards are defined to include career rewards, promotion, 
security, recognition, opportunities to work on visible, interesting projects, as well as 
pay and benefits, the power of the reward systems in concert with leadership 
development becomes critical and clear. 
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PERSON-SITUATION FIT: THE PERSON IN THE FORCE 21 
LEADERSHIP ROLES 
To this point, the logic of macro-organizational theory has provided the basic 
framework and propositions to construct, primarily through deduction, arguments 
regarding strategic and organizational fit as these relate to 21st century military 
organizations. In considering our third and final problem of fit - person-situation fit -
we turn our focus to two key domains of organizational psychology that have 
implications for organizational design, leadership, and military affairs: (1) intrinsic 
task motivation and (2) cognitive complexity and decision-making style. 
Intrinsic Task Motivation 
Motivation theory is concerned with "how behavior gets started, is energized, 
is sustained, is directed, is stopped, and what kind of subjective reaction is present in 
the organism while all this is going on" (Jones, 1955, p. vi). Motivation directs, 
energizes, and sustains purposive, goal-oriented behaviors (i.e., task performance) 
and thus is inferred by observing activities people choose as well as the frequency, 
intensity, and persistence of those activities.26 For purposes of this paper, we 
distinguish three types of motivation and rewards. Intrinsic task motivation seems to 
be increasingly important for the workforce of the 21st century. 
Extrinsic task rewards are contingent on task performance: examples are 
promotions, pay raises, performance bonuses, and formal or informal recognition for 
a job well done. Formal reward systems are designed to use such extrinsic rewards 
to reinforce competencies and align individual goals with organizational goals. A 
major misfit occurs when reward systems reinforce behaviors that conflict with 
strategic intent (e.g., conformity or individualistic careerism where innovation and 
teamwork are valued). Reward system design also is dysfunctional when people feel 
26 Thus we note that: (1) Motivation is an intervening variable. Like intelligence and learning, it 
cannot be observed directly. We must make inferences about motivation based on observations of 
behaviors, including verbal behaviors. (2) Motivation is directional. It directs goal oriented or 
purposive behaviors. Motivation is revealed by the choices we make and the directions we pursue. 
(3) Motivation energizes behavior. Motivation is revealed by individual effort or how energetically 
individual act. Motivated workers "try hard" and are "fired up." (4) Motivation sustains behavior. 
Motivation is revealed by persistence or the duration of effort and time that individuals will expend in 
specific behaviors. Motivated workers persist in the absence of rewards, when "the going gets tough." 
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a sense of inequity or injustice toward reward distribution, in which case they are 
likely to reduce output or quit. A historical problem in many industrial machine 
bureaucracies (e.g., the auto assembly plant) is the absence of internal motivation, 
leaving extrinsic motivation to carry the entire burden of the psychological contract 
between the person and the organization. Military machine bureaucracies (e.g., the 
army on the Western front in World War I) could at least rely to some extent on 
normative-affective motivation. 
Normative-affective rewards satisfy motives generated by internalized values 
and beliefs (i.e., ideology). They thus are related to the internalized norms of 
important reference groups. Internalized standards provide a foundation for self-
regulation in which performing specific actions and achieving specific goals result in 
positive affect (e.g., pride) or negative affect (e.g., shame and guilt). Such motivation 
is especially important in understanding "good citizenship" behaviors and individual 
commitments to fulfill one's duty. Military organizations generally depend on a sense 
of duty, patriotism and honor to motivate the courageous acts required of warriors.27 
Intrinsic task rewards satisfy internal motives that are inherent to - rather than 
contingent on - task performance. Thus, the opportunity to perform the task is itself 
a reward (e.g., flying falls into this category for most pilots). Such behavior is 
especially important in understanding self-management and personal initiative, 
satisfaction and retention, creativity and innovation, and social/interpersonal 
connectedness at work. These are precisely those behaviors increasingly relevant in 
professional organizations and adhocracies.28 It thus is critical to design and lead in 
order to create a context for intrinsic task motivation. 
We follow Thomas (1995, 2000) in describing intrinsic task motivation as 
involving four component processes: (1) a sense of meaningfulness associated with 
27 This has important implications for leadership as a sacred trust. For an examination of the 
consequences suffered when leadership betrays that trust, see Shay's (1994) Achilles in VietNam. 
28 There seems to have been a time when the importance of intrinsic task motivation and highly 
committed workers could be minimized in machine bureaucracies competing on the basis of costs and 
efficiency. However, it now appears that even these organizations require the adoption of high 
involvement human resource practices formally advocated for professionals. Even automobile 
assembly plant benefits from workers who are motivated by pride in their work and intrinsic motivation 
(as modern car manufacturing philosophy at Volvo, Saturn and other plants warrants). For example, 
quality circles improve quality and reduce costs; they largely depend on internal (intrinsic task and 
normative-affective) motivation. (This is not to say equitable extrinsic rewards are not important.) 
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the work; (2) a sense of choice or autonomy; (3) a sense of competence; and (4) a 
sense of progress. 29 These four inner experiences derive from the work activities of 
performing the task. Furthermore, these experiences generate and are generated by 
processes of self-management. 
Leadership and Self-Management 
In much popular and academic literature on organizational theory and human 
resource management (e.g., Lawler, 1986,1992, 1996), the phrase "Command and 
Control" has become a synonymous with centralization, autocratic direct supervision, 
and standardization of processes. Among many writers, the phrase conjures up an 
image of the machine bureaucracy in which employees are expected not to think, but 
to follow orders. Figure 10 presents an image of the machine bureaucracy 
leadership model that this stereotype of military "command and control" suggests to 
many. 
Insert Figure 1 0 about here 
The Machine Bureaucracy Leadership Model. In this model, individual 
performance is under the exclusive direction and control of external management 
processes. Power tends to be positional and backed up by extrinsic rewards and 
punishments. Either the work is controlled in terms of standardized procedures or 
the orders of a supervisor who assigns goals, provides plans, prioritizes, and 
chooses how the work is done and who works together. The supervisor thus 
commands (i.e., plans, directs, organizes and coordinates individual performance; he 
29 The four intrinsic rewards are described more completely as follows: (Thomas & Tymon, 1993, p. 
9): 
Choice is the opportunity you feel to select task activities that make sense to you and to perform them 
in ways that seem appropriate. The feeling of choice is the feeling of being free to choose--of being 
able to use your own judgment and act out of your own understanding of the task. 
Competence is the accomplishment you feel in skillfully performing task activities you have chosen. 
The feeling of competence involves the sense that you are doing good, quality work on a task. 
Meaningfulness is the opportunity you feel to pursue a worthy task purpose. The feeling of 
meaningfulness is the feeling that you are on a path that is worth your time and energy--that you are 
on a valuable mission, that your purpose matters in the larger scheme of things. 
Progress is the accomplishment you feel in achieving the task purpose. The feeling of progress 
involves the sense that the task is moving forward, that your activities are really accomplishing 
something. 
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Figure 10 
The Machine Bureaucracy Model of Leadership (cf. Jansen & Thomas, 1996) 
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or she also monitors (i.e., controls) the quality and quantity of performance outputs. 
At the extreme, the job lacks any "vertical loading" associated with "job enrichment", 
although the job may be "enlarged." The employee is treated as a "subordinate" in a 
one-down, parent to child frame of reference. Influence is one way. Although 
intrinsic task motivation is minimized, the superior may be able to inspire and 
motivate the individual by appealing to values and ideology (i.e., internal normative-
affective motivation). However, such a motivational base is unlikely to generate 
creative, innovative behaviors. In general, in the absence of a moral goal (e.g., 
patriotism), this model of leadership generates compliance at best, and resistance 
and sabotage at its worst (Deci, 1995). 
The leader caught in a machine bureaucracy leadership model cannot rely on 
information processing capacity and knowledge of subordinates. He must make all 
decisions regarding any exceptions not covered by standardization. Through the 
midline, leaders' time and activities frequently focus on enforcing rules. 
An Emoowerment Model of Leadership. An alternative model of motivation is 
presented in Figure 11. In this model, individual performance is generated and 
monitored by the worker herself. She is thus mobilized by her own intrinsic motives 
as she makes choices about how to do the work, who to consult with, who to 
coordinate and mutually adjust with, how and how frequently to adjust, what goals 
are most important in terms of the mission, how to prioritize activities, the quality 
standards and times to impose on herself, the scheduling and monitoring of 
resources and deadlines with respect to the larger project and task 
interdependencies. 
The leader influences and is influenced by the worker and functions primarily 
as a coach, working to develop the worker and help with weaknesses. Scaffolding 
refers to a behavioral strategy in which the insightful leader recognizes where a 
worker (or "associate") is weak and carefully creates a support structure that allows 
for the shaping and development of skills. The leader functions to acquire necessary 
resources and coordinate tasks between her work team and other work teams. 
Influence processes tend to be based on personal power-- knowledge, information, 
expertise and goodwill -- rather than positional power. Influence is two way as the 
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leader uses the relationship as an opportunity for her own self-development and 
learning. The relationship is adult to adult. 
Insert Figure 11 about here 
In this model, considerable energy and investment is made in the leadership 
and management skills of the worker. The knowledge of workers is valued, cultivated 
and increased not only in terms of accomplishing work tasks, but also in terms of 
managerial processes. The worker is assessed in terms of long-term career 
development in addition to job performance. (The model does not require lowering of 
standards and discipline.) This requires a leader with much greater interpersonal 
competency and cognitive complexity with respect to people than a leader who relies 
on issuing orders, reinforcing rules, and monitoring behavior. There is an increase in 
the organization's overall information processing capacity and decision-making 
authority. Trust is increased as workers are empowered, and a learning culture 
develops to provide a long-term sustainable competitive advantage. 
Empowerment increases as intrinsic task motivation increases. People feel 
empowered when they have a sense that they are working toward a meaningful 
purpose with autonomy and competence as they make consistent progress. 
Leadership tasks that increase intrinsic task motivation. include providing them with 
the information they need to make decisions and coordinate their activities; 
developing their knowledge so they are able to interpret and use the information 
appropriately; giving them the authority to make decisions; and creating a context of 
accountability and rewards so that they share in the consequences of their 
performance (Lawler, 1996). 
A Command and Coordination Self-Management Model. The empowered 
leadership model in Figure 11 may seem to represent an idealized image of work. 
Individuals who report on being "in the zone" or doing exceptionally creative work that 
they are proud of report that they were in a "flow" that is congruent with the 
empowerment model of leadership (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997). Indeed, there are many 
times when leaders find that they have sufficient trust and confidence in their 
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Figure 11 
Leadership via Self-Management and Coaching (Jansen & Thomas, 1995) 
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subordinates to express their intent and then decentralize implementation.30 
However, especially in an environment of hostility, change or complexity, a more 
appropriate leadership model may well be the one illustrated in Figure 12. 
Insert Figure 12 about here 
In this model, the leader is faced with a most challenging requirement: to shift 
between two leadership styles as conditions warrant. This contingency model is 
appropriate when there are situations when it is appropriate to intervene and pursue 
micro-involvement (i.e., "taking charge"). Such directive involvement is appropriate 
when stress or overload has incapacitated or diminished a subordinate's ability or 
confidence; when experience and education have not prepared a subordinate to 
cope with critical situations where mistakes are costly and destructive; when critical 
information is available only to higher authority; when the commander no longer 
trusts the motives and goodwill of the subordinate. To the degree that a commander 
wants to maximize the information processing capacity of his organization while 
maintaining a balance between personal and subordinate accountability, this "dual 
track" model is appropriate. 
Leadership's Building Blocks for Intrinsic Rewards and Self-Management 
Thomas (2000) has suggested a number of "building blocks for intrinsic 
rewards" that can be organized according to the form of intrinsic motivation is impacts 
most directly. {A discussion of demographics and the changes in the social and 
cultural context of the larger society are beyond the scope of this paper. However, 
the author believes a survey of this literature would add to the importance of officers 
of the future understanding how to lead through intrinsic task rewards, empowerment, 
and self-management.) 
In the realm of leading through increasing subordinates' sense of choice, 
Thomas indicates that appropriate building blocks include: 
30 This seems to be what many mean by, "Centralized decision-making, decentralized control." 
However, empowerment includes a "sense of choice" that is negated if decision-making is indeed 
completely centralized. 
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Figure 12 
Empowered Command and Coordination: Self-Management Supplemented by Command and Control 
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• appropriately delegating authority congruent with employee's skills and 
experience; 
• creating a climate of trust and behaving trustfully with respect to workers; 
• avoiding punishment for honest mistakes; 
• providing relevant and necessary information; and 
• providing a clear sense of intent so that subordinates know the appropriate 
frame of reference and value sets for making judgments. 
Employees' sense of competence is increased through: 
• education and training that provides them the knowledge they require; 
• positive feedback and an appreciative posture whenever appropriate; 
• placement in a challenging - neither too routine and boring nor too 
overwhelming and challenging - environment whenever possible; 
• high, non-comparative standards that emphasize task excellence and team 
building. 
Meaningfulness is generated by a non-cynical climate in which credibility is 
fostered through: 
• follow-through and consistency of purpose; 
• clearly identified passions and an exciting vision; 
• clearly relating individual and team tasks to mission accomplishment; and 
• the opportunity to do whole (versus fragmented) tasks in which the worker 
feels responsibility for a complete effort. 
Progress is served by a: 
• collaborative climate; 
• clear milestones and celebrations when these milestones are 
accomplished; 
• access to end users and those that are protected and served; and 
• measures of improvement. 
Cognitive Complexity and Decision Making Style 
A second domain of person-situation fit theory has been largely ignored. It 
relates to how officers think, approach and solve problems, and make decisions. A 
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large body of research indicates that people differ systematically in their cognitive or 
decision making styles. These differences can be understood by deploying Human 
information Processing Systems (HIPS) Theory (Steuffert & Streuffert, 1978; ; Driver 
& Streuffert, 1969; Driver, Brousseau, Hunsacker, 1998) theory. HIPS31 theory (or 
integrative complexity theory): 
considers how people [and groups] process information, the mental 
structures that aid processing, and the situational characteristics that 
influence processing. Integrative complexity is defined as the ability of 
individuals [and groups] to process information using the cognitive 
processes of differentiation and integration. Using differentiation, a 
person [or group] generates ideas from several different dimensions, or 
points of view. Integration refers to the process of developing complex 
connections between those dimensions. When a topic is viewed from 
several alternative (and perhaps inconsistent) perspectives, the ability 
to integrate involves reconceptualizing a problem so that two or more 
dimensions are combined in a way that reconciles the inconsistencies 
between the different perspectives. (Grise & Gallupe, 2000) 
HIPS theory can be defined - as above -with respect to ability. It generally is 
applied to individuals, although the human system could as easily be a group. It is 
well known that individuals and groups differ in talent and that talent is developed into 
expertise by education and experience. Figure 5 indicates that any HIPS can be 
pushed into a range of information overload with too many inputs in a given time 
period. An expert HIPS has a greater capacity to cope with information load through 
the benefit of hundreds or even thousands of relevant case experiences. Such 
expert decision makers have the "mental structures" or schemas required to 
recognize patterns quickly and "chunk" information so that they are using their scarce 
mental resources more efficiently.32 Thus, a human resource career system is 
designed to develop competencies. 
31 HIPS theory appears to be synonymous with Integrative Complexity Theory, which is the preferred 
theoretical name used by Frise and Gallupe. 
32 The principle of "chunking" refers to a cognitive process by which people organize a set of 
information so that it can be encoded as a patterned unit of information, thus requiring fewer mental 
resources. Thus an expert chess player may see a pattern of pieces - queen, king, rook, bishop, 
knight three pawns - in terms of a single, well-known pattern, thus taking up one chunk. By contrast, 
a beginning player would use almost all her mental resources trying to appreciate and recall this 
configuration, because she would be seeing the pieces rather than the patterned whole; she might 
require five chunks to store the data. {People typically recall seven plus or minus two chunks.) The 
expert, master player can thus recall and reconstruct -- after only a few moments - the positions of an 
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While differences in cognitive abilities generally are well recognized, less 
attention and awareness are awarded to cognitive style. HIPS theory observes that 
people and groups differ with respect to their cognitive motivation and decision 
styles.33 Styles are habitual modes or preferred patterns of using information. Driver 
and his colleagues identify two dimensions that relate to how people differentiate and 
integrate information. One dimension - the amount of information processed -
differentiates individuals into satisficing types, who seek enough information to make 
a "good enough" decision, and maximizing types, who seek enough information to 
make the "best possible" decision. A second dimension - focus - differentiates 
individual who focus on a single solution or point of view versus those who focus on 
multiple-solutions or points of view. Thus people have different styles ranging from 
the simplest - a preference for low information and a single point of view - to 
complex - a preference for high information and multiple perspectives. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to present the rich, extensive literature on 
style theory, but several basic points should be highlighted. 
1. Individuals and groups can act against style and are likely to do so if the 
reward system clearly reinforces alternative behavior. In such cases, they 
may slowly change their style (e.g., become more integrative with increased 
education or more decisive with tactical operational experience). They are 
likely to resist large, non-temporary style shifts; they are more likely to alter 
their work situation (e.g., increase or decrease task complexity and their 
network of associates) so that they can use their preferred style. If this 
should fail, they are likely to seek out alternative situations more congruent 
entire game, and indeed, the entire game itself. By contrast, a beginning player would use almost all 
her mental resources trying to remember a small subset of the total game board's pieces. If the 
pieces are placed randomly on the board, so that previous experience and the pattern of play 
becomes irrelevant, the novices and experts demonstrate comparable recall (Hirsch, 1987). 
33 This is not a theory about ability but about motives. Therefore, it is not relevant in considering how 
effectively people can perform or what their capacity is. People are capable of altering their dominant 
style if it is clear that a situation requires it. Thus, an introvert may actively participate in a group 
discussion when it is clearly recognized that rewards and punishments are based on active 
participation. However, he or she will not be operating in their most comfortable zone of motivation 
and behavior. In time, the individual can be expected seek to alter the situation or find a new situation 
that is more congruent with his or her habitual mode of behavior. 
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with their style (e.g., quit the organization or seek a new career path in an 
existing organization). 
2. There is no one best style for all individuals or groups any more than there for 
all organizations. What is "best" depends on the context of situation, mission, 
role and tasks. Some roles demand decisive, simpler styles; others demand 
integrative complex styles. 
3. Consistent with the inverted U curve in Figure 5, individuals (and groups) 
simplify their information processing style under overload or stress. People 
do not prefer to use their most complex mental processes when overloaded. 
4. Individuals (and groups) often have predictable conflicts depending on 
differences in decision-making style. 
5 .. Teams and groups can capitalize on diversity of style given that they 
understand and appreciate their own and others individual differences, 
strengths, and weaknesses, and thus handle conflicts. 
6. Decision-making style and ability have low if any correlation. Preference for 
integrative complexity does not predict capacity or talent. 
Decision Stvle and Person-Organization Fit 
Different organizational configurations shape and reinforce different decision 
styles and decision cultures. As the modal military organization continues to move 
from the machine bureaucracy model toward professional bureaucracy model or 
upward to a hybrid adhocracy configuration, we should expect increased integrative 
complexity and more complex decision styles from officers throughout the chain of 
command. More interestingly, the human resource system will need to consider how 
groups can be generated that capitalize on individual diversity of talent and style to 
generate teams with sufficient complexity and unity of effort to cope with dynamic 
environments. 
Machine Bureaucracy. Command and control based on direct supervision and 
standardization of processes shapes individuals and groups to collect a "good 
enough" amount of information and to focus quickly to a single solution or alternative, 
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especially as they are lower in the chain of command or at the operational core. 
Procedures and rules provide a recipe for success; one need not think of alternatives 
if the organization has provided a formalized solution to the problem. One need not 
cultivate critical and divergent thinking or professional judgment if the chain of 
command will handle any exceptions that arise. 
With promotion and more complex jobs, leadership roles change. Some 
individuals who were the most frustrated earlier in their career begin to find the 
intrinsic motivation that they were missing. They may be the ones designing the 
standard operating procedures, making decisions about exceptions, and generating 
strategic intent for their subordinates. As they work at the boundaries of the 
organization and in coordinating tasks with other functions and divisions, they must 
develop a higher tolerance for ambiguity and complexity in their thinking and 
decision-making. They realize that problems are typically managed rather than 
resolved; convergent thinking must be balanced with divergent thinking; and "good 
enough" solutions are sometimes inadequate, especially when time and resources for 
more creative, rigorous, deliberative thinking is available. None-the-less, as long as 
the environment remains stable, there is no requirement for such creativity and 
innovation. 
Professional Bureaucracy. The professionalization of the military and of 
command and coordination processes allows for more diversity of individual styles. 
The modal style within the organization necessarily shifts to one toward more 
integrative complexity as professionals develop complicated mental structures to deal 
with their domains of expertise. As lower level work is "vertically loaded" with 
planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling tasks, individuals are 
able to develop and self-select themselves into work roles and leadership roles that 
are appropriate to their abilities and styles. Because jobs vary in terms of time 
pressures and information complexity, and because professionals have considerable 
leeway in how they will achieve results, there is likely to be a "home" for individuals 
who prefer to gather a great deal of information and those who gather less; for those 
who are divergent thinkers as well as for those who are convergent thinkers. Even 
though the organization itself may not operate in a changing environment requiring 
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innovation, the professionals are able to use creativity in solving the problems that 
emerge in dealing with their complex tasks. Intrinsic task motivation tends to be high, 
complex cognitive styles are acceptable, sometimes even desired. There is, 
however, less need to tolerate ambiguity and stress than in organizations that must 
contend with dynamic change and hostility. 
Adhocracy. As organizations enter complex, changing environments, they 
depend primarily on mutual adjustment to plan, direct, organize, control, and 
coordinate. As the environment shifts, and especially if competitors are driving those 
changes (i.e., hostility exists), then it becomes much more important to be able to see 
the world through several perspectives and to reconceptualize competing 
perspectives into coherent action plans that can account for the relevant complexity. 
Mutual adjustment may increase greater potential for different styles - with their 
attendant weaknesses and strengths - to complement each other, if they have an 
appropriate level of understanding and trust for the workings of style in decision-
making. This in itself represents a small degree of integrative complexity. Complex, 
equivocal situations require some individuals who will, by second nature, seek 
additional knowledge- to hen time allows, even though enough information appears 
to be available see differing points of view and different alternatives. There also must 
be individuals who press for decisive action in the context of clear time constraints 
and deadlines. Such an organization would - in theory - be able to balance the 
conflicting demands of decisive action with integrative, flexible operations. 
This human information systems perspective is that, to be effective and 
successful, officers should: 
1. "Understand their own styles of decision making; 
2. Know how to identify, understand, work with [and lead] the varied styles of 
other people, and 
3. Match their own styles to the types of jobs for which they are best suited." 
(Driver, Brousseau, & Hunsaker, 1998, p. 3) 
By implication, this suggests that the human resource management system 
function to facilitate individuals' learning and understanding of their own styles and 
Working draft: ejansen@nps.navy.mil 48 
others' styles, both by testing and simulation. This means learning to appreciate and 
take advantage of other' styles that simultaneously frustrate and complement one's 
own style. It means learning to forge teams that appreciate and understand how to 
take advantage not only of differences in expertise and talent but also of differences 
in preferences for information load and the number of perspectives or frames of 
reference to consider. 
High Involvement HR Policies, Practices and Procedures 
The HR structures and processes of the 21st century force define, generate, 
reinforce and sustain the competencies required by the larger organization. The HR 
organization generally operates in the more stable context of the services and thus -
like the services - can be expected resemble a bureaucracy more than an 
adhocracy. It none-the-less can be expected to increasingly professionalize and 
generate skills associated with innovation, organizational learning, and change 
management relevant to an RMA and the operational force. It will need to generate 
intrinsic task motivation and appropriate teams with mixes of integrative complexity. 
It can be expected to increasingly resemble state-of-the art HR systems of successful 
corporations competing in competitive, dynamic, complex global business 
environments. To compete successfully in the labor market for knowledge workers, it 
will need to continue to generate "high involvement" among its members and in its 
culture. 
High involvement leadership requires a synergy between the organizational 
practices of line managers and HR structures and processes. (Again, human 
resource issues in the 21st century force cannot be assigned to an HR function, but 
the HR function is critical in structuring and supporting such practices.) A list of 
practices of high involvement managers emerging from research by Lawler and 
Mohrman (1989) include the following: 
• Apprise the performance of all subordinates annually. 
• Allow substantial subordinate input into performance appraisal. 
• Counsel all employees about their career at least every two years. 
• Allow substantial subordinate input into the career development plan. 
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• Gather data from subordinates and include it in all appraisals of managers. 
• Be open to suggestions about work methods and procedures. 
• Ask subordinates if they agree that openness to new ideas and methods 
exists. 
• Install methods or suggestions that come from subordinates. 
• Hold frequent state-of-the-business meetings. 
• Educate employees on how success is measured in the business and the 
economics of the business. 
• Cross train employees and expose them to work that is done in other 
areas. 
• Meet regularly with employees in the work area to exchange information. 
• Share success and recognition with all members of a work unit. 
• Explain the reward system. 
• Make sure employees receive feedback from their customers. 
• Provide employees with opportunities to give feedback to suppliers. 
• Encourage employees to make decisions bout how to do their work. 
• Train employees in how their work its into the larger organization. 
(Lawler, 1992, p. 270). 
CONCLUSIONS 
The officer of the future question can be addressed from many perspectives, 
and the perspective chosen largely determines the answers and insights generated. 
This paper has framed the question at the very general level of strategic fit and 
organization fit. Clearly, the ideas must be translated to medium range theory 
applicable to specific operational commands. This will require a partnership between 
line officers- some associated with an HR (or manpower) community -- and HR 
professionals who draw on state-of-the-art theory and practice. It will require 
innovation and experimentation with respect to HR tasks and functions as surely as 
technical innovation in the fleet requires fleet battle experiments. It also will require 
mid-range theory congruent with specific command contexts. (For an excellent 
example in the context of U.S. Army Reserve (TPU) Units, see Thomas and Barrios-
Chaplin [1996].) 
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The 21st century force comprises a constellation of organizations and units. 
We must beware of answers that suggest a single ideal solution for all organizations 
and officers. There isn't one. However, to the degree that the future is indeed one of 
continuing increases in complexity and rapid change, then new modes of planning, 
organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, and motivating can be expected. 
Professionalization and mutual adjustment can be expected to increase in 
importance for the force and for officers as a whole. Professional bureaucracies will 
become increasingly common. Machine bureaucracies will become increasingly rare. 
Operational organizations will "morph" into network forms resembling adhocracies as 
hostilities and dynamic change accelerate toward chaos. This has implications for 
the design of human resource policies, systems, practices and procedures. These 
implications are in the direction of decentralization, mutual adjustment and teams, 
trust, intrinsic motivation and empowerment, professionalization, education, and 
integrative complexity. 
Human resource structures and processes are central to the success of the 
future force. The HR organizations of the military can be expected to continue to be 
- especially given the size of the force - bureaucratic, but they will become 
increasingly professionalized to meet the demands of sophisticated, complex tasks 
and technologies and the expectations of knowledge workers. "High involvement" 
practices (cf. Lawler and his colleagues) increasingly will be supported and 
formalized. Empowerment and intrinsic task motivation will become increasingly 
important, while the importance of normative-affective motivation and equitable 
extrinsic motivation will continue to require leadership's attention. HR policies, 
practices, and procedures adopted by corporate leaders in competitive, changing, 
complex environment will be benchmarked and adapted by officers and commanders 
in an HR professional community as they play increasingly important roles as 
strategic partners and change agents. The status of HR will rise only to the extent it 
is designed in congruence with strategy and technology and has the attention and 
support of top leadership, and the success of resourcing competent, motivated 
personnel may well depend on the status of HR. (It will certainly depend on how 
DoD is perceived as an employer.) 
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Organizational design emphasizes that strategy, technology, and structure 
must be designed synergistically, as a whole, or the overall organization will sub-
optimize and miss key opportunities. The leadership of DoD and its services is 
attempting to be mindful not only of strategy and technology as sources of 
competitive advantage, but of organization and human resources as well. This is 
congruent with the course ahead. 
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